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Abstract 
This paper makes a case for using cost effectiveness (as opposed to efficiency) as key criterion when designing 
support policies for electricity generation from renewable energy sources in coexistence with an emissions trading 
scheme. Using the EU ETS and the German feed-in tariff system as examples, arguments against a stand-alone ETS 
are presented and necessary conditions for cost-effective support to RES-E in a deep decarbonization context are 
synthesized. 
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1. Introduction 
2015 marks the year of the 10th anniversary of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) and the 15th anniversary of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). The EEG triggered 
the installation of renewable energy capacity so that the share of renewables in gross electricity 
generation increased from 6.6% in 2000 to 26.2% in 2014 [1]. At the same time the participants of the EU 
ETS achieved emission reductions at lower costs than anticipated. Thus, both instruments have proven to 
be effective with regard to their specific targets. In contrast, during their ten years of co-existence this 
policy mix has faced large criticism of being inefficient, mainly due to overlaps in the power generation 
sector [2]–[7]. At the centre of debate is the neoclassical economics argument, that the EEG did not have 
any impact on climate change as it did not alter the GHG emissions cap and, hence, did not result in 
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additional emission reductions. Furthermore, it supposedly freed emission allowances (EUA) in the 
German power generation sector, which watered down the EUA price and shifted emissions to other 
sectors and other European countries (“leakage”). 
Not only neoclassical economists are sceptical of inefficient overlaps between ETS and support 
policies for electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Working group III of the 
IPCC warns in its fifth assessment report of emissions leakages in case climate policies are introduced at 
a lower jurisdictional level than an ETS [8]. Other studies share the concern about the risk of leakage and 
inefficiencies, but also identify conditions under which RES-E support may be a useful addition to an 
ETS (cf. [2], [7], [9], [10]). 
The argumentation around the inefficiency of the EEG has been rightly criticized for being too 
simplistic (cf. [11]–[13], and detailed arguments in section 3). From an evaluator’s perspective, taking 
efficiency as key evaluation criterion runs the risks of reducing climate-energy policy to a purely 
economic question, a question of the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. The dependence on 
uncertain cost benefit analyses (CBA), which heavily rely on contentious assumptions (cf. [14]–[16]), 
does not reflect the clear-cut demands that are set by science and institutionalized in political targets. 
These demands imply the nearly complete decarbonization of industrialized economies by 2050.  
Cost effective policy, in contrast, starts off from the effect, i.e. reaching long-term mitigation targets, 
and then looks for the least costly way to get there. A similar differentiation has been made between short 
and long-term efficiency, and between static and dynamic efficiency [12]. This paper sticks to the terms 
efficiency and cost effectiveness, in order to highlight the shift from a CBA perspective to target 
achievement. Based on this shift, the paper proposes a set of necessary conditions that a cost-effective 
combination of RES-E policies and ETS has to meet. 
2. Material and method 
This paper contributes to the development of criteria for the design and evaluation of RES-E support 
policies in combination with an ETS. The differentiation between the economic criteria efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness is well established in evaluation literature [17], while outside the evaluation community 
the two terms are often used interchangeably.  
A comprehensive literature review was carried out to research the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
a stand-alone ETS and an ETS in combination with RES-E support policies. Further information has been 
gathered by studying the German case.  
The German EEG with its feed-in tariff (FiT) system is the largest and most salient RES-E support 
policy under an ETS. It has received criticism from mainstream economists and environmental 
economists alike. While in the specific German case also the choice of FiTs as the main RES-E support 
instrument is criticized (see [18] for a critical discussion), the focus here is on the question whether RES-
E support under an ETS can be cost effective in general.  
Empirical evidence from the transition of energy technology, infrastructure, markets, business models 
and institutions in German helped to induce conditions for a cost-effective combination of RES-E support 
and ETS. Note that meeting necessary conditions is not yet sufficient for warranting cost effectiveness. 
3. Why an ETS alone is not cost effective 
On the short-run, the EU ETS is both efficient and cost-effective. Despite its failure to create a reliable 
scarcity signal for CO2 emissions, it has worked rather well as a short- to mid-term clearing mechanism 
for well-proven and competitive abatement options [13]. While we cannot know whether an ETS alone 
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will be efficient on the long-run, as there are no reliable cost benefit analyses, it will not be cost-effective 
because of the following reasons:  
x It does not capture the positive externalities resulting from knowledge spill-overs, which means that 
social rates of return to R&D in RES-E technology are higher than investors’ rates of return. The 
resulting underinvestment delays the deployment of mitigation technology (RES-E) or makes 
mitigation much more expensive in the future. [19]–[21] 
x In many cases energy markets are not fully liberalized and there are significant entry barriers, 
such as oligopolies in power generation and distribution, a lack of experience in financing RES-E 
technology with its high up-front costs, missing standards, the lack of information, or specific 
infrastructure (see next point). These barriers are neither addressed nor removed by an ETS. [10], 
[11] 
x Several abatement options are not viable due to lock-in effects of the existing energy system. Even 
abatement options that are otherwise competitive under an ETS, might become prohibitively costly 
if for example the infrastructure to integrate them into the energy system is lacking. In particular 
investments into the electricity grids are needed, which typically requires state intervention. This is 
one of the bottlenecks of the decarbonisation of the German power system, for which large amounts 
of wind power have to be transmitted from the north to the south. [22] 
x An ETS is designed to realize low-cost abatement options first. This does not stimulate the cost-
digression of currently more expensive technologies, which are still needed to achieve deep 
decarbonization. Economies of scale, learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are crucial for 
bringing down prices. By delaying the deployment of RES-E technology it will become more costly 
to reach long-term emissions reduction targets [12], [13]. 
x An ETS is characterised by inherent investment uncertainties, which are triggered both by price-
fluctuations and the periodical re-negotiation of the emissions cap [11]. RES-E technology is, in 
turn, characterised by high upfront cost and long times to market, which makes financing a 
challenge – even without the uncertainties arising from an ETS. Empirical studies show that the EU 
ETS has – due to its lax cap and free allocation of EUAs – so far had a negligible impact on direly 
needed innovation in the electricity sector [23].  
x The emission cap is a highly political variable and the political-economy of setting the cap and its 
digression rate over time do not allow for a sufficiently strong carbon price signal and hence results 
in underinvestment in RES-E technology [11], [24]. Empirical evidence from the EU ETS so far 
illustrates well that full internalization of the external costs of CO2 emissions is nothing but a 
theoretical ideal.  
Delayed development and deployment of RES-E technology, market barriers, insufficient infrastructure 
adaptation, investment uncertainties and an emissions cap, that is likely above the economic optimum, 
mean that emission reduction targets are reached too late or at very high costs in future decades, both 
indicators that a stand-alone ETS is not cost effective. 
Due to institutional lock-in, the EU ETS is currently the only comprehensive mechanism in Europe to 
internalize some of the external costs of emitting CO2 in the atmosphere. Hence, the following section 
develops conditions for cost-effective RES-E support, under the assumption that an ETS is in place. 
4. Necessary conditions for a cost-effective combination of RES-E support and ETS 
While cost-effective policy-making for deep decarbonisation is an extremely challenging and complex 
task, some necessary elements and features of combining RES-E support and ETS emerged from the 
German case and the literature review:  
x Reliable mid to long-term decarbonisation targets have to be set, progress towards the target has 
to be monitored, and the policy mix has to be adjusted if actual developments are slower than 
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required by the target fulfilment trajectory. Stability and certainty are important drivers of 
innovation. Long-term targets have even had a more positive impact on innovation in the electricity 
sector than the EU ETS. [23], [25] 
x Moreover, the targets for the development of RES-E need to be considered in setting the cap of 
the ETS. Thus, only systematic overachievement of renewable electricity targets in Europe would 
result in an unanticipated oversupply of EUAs and consequently in emissions leakage. When the cap 
was set for the 2013-20 trading period of the EU ETS, the planned growth of renewables was 
considered in the underlying modelling work [26]. Under these circumstances RES-E support can 
even be seen as a “cap-catalyser” when re-negotiating the cap, i.e. a mechanism to make abatement 
cheaper and accelerate emission reductions [24]. 
x The addition of RES-E support instruments to the ETS require a flexible but also reliable ETS in 
order to respond to changing abatement options and associated costs, e.g. by re-negotiating the cap 
more frequently or by setting a floor price in EUA auctions.  
x Early market deployment of existing technologies must accompany R&D for RES-E, because the 
comprehensive transformation of the energy systems takes time [27], [28]. RES-E demand pull 
policies trigger economies of scale and technology learning [23]. Furthermore, wide-spread 
deployment also helps to identify the barriers connected to a high penetration of RES-E as early as 
possible (e.g. grid infrastructure needs and re-design of the power market) [28]. In Germany the 
EEG resulted in so much learning-by-doing that renewables start to undercut their own success, as 
the market value of renewable electricity decreases at higher penetration rates [29]. Another aspect 
of early development and deployment of RES-E is the discussion around the need for “backstop” 
technologies. RES-E technology can serve as a kind of insurance against exploding costs, in case it 
turns out that decarbonisation has to be deeper and happen sooner than anticipated [10].  
x Support to RES-E should be diverse in terms of supported technologies and actors. Despite large 
progress in technology and knowledge, it is all but clear which technologies, actors, business models 
and institutions will be part of a decarbonised energy system. The lock-in into a fossil fuel based 
energy system should not be replaced by a new lock-in, as the transition from one system to the 
other takes decades [28]. 
x Diversity does not rule out technology-specific support to immature RES-E technology. Both 
policy intervention and a hands-off approach will create winners and losers, so that the focus should 
be not to pick the wrong technologies and create as much competition as possible among the 
remaining ones [28], [30].  
More general criteria for the good governance of RES-E technology can also be found in [10, pp. 40–
41], [22, p. 343]. 
5. Conclusions 
Climate change is a pressing issue. What is needed is disruptive change, a rapid transition, even 
referred to as an “implosion” of the current carbon energy system [31].  
There is strong evidence that deep decarbonisation targets and ambitious climate policies are also 
economically sound, in other words efficient. Still the underlying CBAs are based on assumptions, e.g. 
about damage costs and discount rates. Even though it may be very plausible to assume high damage 
costs and modest discount rates, the mere fact that efficiency considerations are based on assumptions 
creates uncertainty. This uncertainty trickles down to debates about the efficiency of specific local or 
national RES-E support. If, on the other hand, policy is primarily motivated by the scientific and social 
consensus about the need for deep decarbonisation by 2050, then economic considerations mainly aim at 
finding the least costly way of getting there, rather than questioning the economics behind the target as 
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such. If the consensus is accepted, so should be the shift from efficiency to cost effectiveness in policy 
evaluation. 
The preliminary conditions for cost effective RES-E support under an ETS that are presented in this 
paper still have to be confirmed in expert interviews and further national and regional case studies. 
Moreover, quantitative modelling can help to show under which assumptions (about discount rates, the 
social cost of carbon, and the digression of low-carbon technology costs) RES-E support proves to be 
economically efficient and not only cost effective. One promising pathway is to fill del Rio’s analytical 
framework [12] with empirical data. It is important to note, that this type of modelling is not needed if the 
necessity for deep decarbonization is accepted as the starting point for policy analysis. 
This paper only looks at electricity from renewable energy sources. Yet, RES-E technology will only 
contribute successfully to deep decarbonization if also large energy efficiency improvements are realized 
and the sufficiency in the consumption of energy services is increased. 
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